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Resumen: El aumento de la contratación de empresas privadas militares y de seguridad privada a 
nivel global crea un problema de regulación debido a las debilidades en la aplicación clara del Derecho 
Humanitario y Derechos Humanos existentes, y de las deficiencias intrínsecas inherentes a la delega-
ción. Este artículo evalúa el tema de la creación de una regulación legal en relación al sector a través 
de la aplicación de la teoría de “Bottom-Up Lawmaking” a las asociaciones profesionales vinculadas 
a dicha industria. Señala un cambio en el modelo clásico centrado en el Estado, donde en vez de la 
formación de políticas para ser interiorizadas en la práctica, el análisis demuestra un proceso orgánico 
centrado en la creación de normativas por parte de los profesionales que terminen exteriorizadas a nivel 
del Estado a través de la agregación de su contenido.
Palabras clave: empresas privadas militares y de seguridad privada, bottom-up lawmaking, nor-
mativas internas, regulación. 
Abstract: The increased contracting of private military and security companies on a global scale 
creates a regulatory issue due to the weaknesses in clearly applying existing international humanitarian 
and human rights law, as well as the intrinsic control deficiencies inherent in delegation. This article as-
sesses the issue of the formation of regulatory policy as it relates to the sector through the application of 
the theory of Bottom-Up Lawmaking to the professional associations related to the industry. It points to 
a change in the classic state-centric model, where instead of the formation of policy to be internalized 
in practice, the analysis demonstrates an organic process centered on the norms created by practitioners 
being externalized to the state level through content aggregation.
 Key Words: private military and security companies, bottom-up lawmaking, internal norms, 
regulation.
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I. General Considerations
1. The issue of the regulation of private military and security companies (PMSC) has received 
increased attention of late. The academic treatment usually revolves around state responsibility and the 
application of humanitarian and human rights instruments to an actor that does not fit neatly into the 
existing definitions of the subjects of international law. Less frequent, but present, is the treatment of 
the sector from a control perspective, dealing with the negative implications of delegation inherent in a 
principal-agent relationship created through contracting.
2. The overarching theme regardless of the academic approach to the subject matter is the fact 
that the regulation of the industry is apparently deficient on both the domestic and international levels. 
This article takes the position that remedy to the regulation concerns on the contemporary actions of the 
PMSC industry require the application of equally as contemporary research parameters to the subject. It 
specifically analyzes the professional associations related to the industry as a source of policy content at 
a state level following the theory of Bottom-Up Lawmaking (BUL).
3. The article begins by briefly outlining the central weaknesses in the current regulatory fra-
mework. It first touches on those found in the application of humanitarian and human rights law to the 
PMSC sector. The reader must understand that much of the debate of the legal architecture applicable to 
the sector necessitates the argumentation of distinct scenarios in order to prove where a PMSC could be 
subject to the existing legal norms, contrasting possible theoretical application with real cases. Although 
the practical examples manifest the variations between the legal theory and the current reality, the limits 
of this article do not allow for their in depth treatment. The objective of this section is to highlight the 
general challenges in the application of existing international law and demonstrate that the current situa-
tion is a coexistence of possible applications of existing norms with lacunas that remain legally uncove-
red. The article compliments this overview with a look at the core control issues present in delegation, 
in an attempt to give the reader a general, although brief, understanding of the necessity for improved 
overall regulation. 
4. Having established these facts, the article then moves into the application of the parameters of 
BUL to the PMSC sector, focusing on the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the 
British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), as the leaders in the field of professional 
associations related to the sector.1 What the research looks to prove is that these private associations 
meet the same criteria stipulated by the theory that have been verified sources of content of international 
law and transnational regulation.
5. It is important to note from the onset that the application of BUL does not eliminate or replace 
the role of the state in the classic terms of policy formation. The theory does not negate that binding 
legal norms emanate from the proclamations and actions of states.2 It describes a system where the BUL 
approach and the classic theory function side by side. What it proposes is a change in the role of the 
state in the development of those instruments.3 It describes a directional flow where the norms ascend 
from the private professional association to “hard” law through the appropriation of normative concepts, 
1  See International Peace Operations Association (IPOA): http://ipoaonline.org. British Association of Pri-
vate Security Companies (BAPSC): http://www.bapsc.org.uk. The Private Security Company Association of Iraq 
(PSCAI) has not been considered in the scope of the article due to the fact that the majority of its functions are 
related to domestic permitting processes. See http://www.pscai.org. 
2  G.h.	Guttal, “Sources of International Law: Contemporary Trends” in n.	sinGh	et	al, International Law 
in Transition: essays in memory of Judge Nagendra Singh. Martinus Nijhoff, 1992. pp. 183. (in relation to the 
United Nations)
3  J.	levit, “Bottom-up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International 
Law”, Fifth Annual Young Scholars Conference: The “New” New Haven School: International Law - Past, Present 
and Future, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 2007, pp. 412.
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in part or fully, by official state institutions.4 Within this process the association acts as a muse, being 
inspirational and iterative at the same time. It results in the norms of the group acting as a base catalyst 
and a standard of reference against which official legislators redact and evaluate the subsequent law.5 
II. Definition Private Military and Security Company
6. The modern resurgence of private military and security companies in the post-Cold War era cu-
rrently presents several issues in terms of the regulation of the industry under existing legal frameworks, 
as well as several impediments to the creation of new forms of applicable policy.6 This is in large part 
due to an emerging global pattern of increased dependence on military and security services provided 
by this non-sovereign market.7 These companies have a recognized utility for their clients, be it implicit 
or explicit, who range from states, corporations, individuals and nongovernmental and international 
organizations.8
7. The PMSC industry is comprised of a group of heterogeneous entities that neither look alike 
nor serve the same markets.9 The general universal commonalities in the sector can be found in the fact 
that all PMSC share a common organizational business structure as for-profit companies, who provide 
a professional service to their clients based on a contractual relationship, and by definition are private, 
meaning that they are the property of non-state actors. But as it is a diverse sector, an in depth analysis 
of the wide array of specific services provided falls outside of the scope of this paper.10 At the lack of a 
common and globally accepted definition of the private military and security industry, one can define 
the PMSC as-- private, for-profit business entities dedicated to providing professional services includ-
ing: support, consulting and the direct supply of profession capabilities related to security and defense. 
This operational definition captures the fact that the industry is comprised of revenue generating entities 
constituted under legal business structures, within which governments do not play a role in the manage-
ment structure. It underlines the fact that the businesses are prepared to provide clients with a range of 
specific professional services via a contractual agreement.
III. Deficiencies in the existing legal framework
8. The deficiencies in the existing regulation of the PMSC sector relate to responsibility and con-
sequences for illicit acts, as well as levels of control in delegation, and how those affect civilians, the 
states and the PMSC themselves. This article rejects the notion of a total legal vacuum propagated by 
some authors in relation to PMSC.11 What it does recognize is that existing legal architecture is complex, 
4  J.	levit, “Bottom-up Lawmaking Through Pluralist Lends: The ICC Banking Commission and the Trans-
nationl Regulation of Letters of Credit”, Emory Law Journal, vol. 57,  2008, pp. 1182.
5  Ibid.
6  For a discussion on the historical background see: d.	shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 
Routledge, 1998, pp. 69; s.	arMstronG, War Plc: The Rise of the New Corporate Mercenary, Faber Press, 2008; 
c.	ortiz, “Overseas Trade in Early Modernity and the Emergence of Embryonic Private Military Companies”, in 
t.	JäGer	&	G.	küMMel, Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Vs 
Verlag, 2007. pp. 11-22; k.	Ballard, “The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution 
of the Private Military Industry” in Ibid, pp. 42.
7  p.w.	sinGer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell University Press, 
2003, pp. 18.
8  J.	MaoGoto	&	B.	sheehy, “Contemporary private military firms under international law: an unregulated 
‘gold rush”, Adelaide Law Review, vol. 26(2), 2006, pp. 245-269. (speaking to the utility of the companies to cli-
ents)
9  infra note 7, pp. 88.
10  See infra note 7, pp. 92-100; M.	von	BoeMcken, BICC- Private Military and Security Companies: Origins 
and Definitions, COST Action A25 Network Meeting on Private Military Companies, 9-10 Feb 2006.
11  For a discussion the possible legal vacuum see: p.w.	sinGer, ‘‘War, profits and the vacuum of law: Priva-
tized military firms and international law’’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, no. 42, 2004, pp. 521; c.	
walker	&	d.	whyte, ‘‘Contracting out war? Private military companies, law and regulation in the United King-
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and at points can appear disjointed, and in some respects contradictory.12 The analysis of the application 
of international humanitarian law, human rights law, and issues of control in a principal-agent relation-
ship demonstrate the inadequacy of current regulation.
1. International Humanitarian Law
9. The upsurge in the reliance on military contractors raises the issue of their definition and rela-
ted protection under the Geneva Conventions and the associated Protocols, which act as a basis for the 
application of international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflict. The application of IHL has also 
proven problematic especially due to the fact that states, confronted with present day realities of warfare, 
often have different interpretations of the content of the law and of the measures and mechanisms for its 
implementation.13 Thus civilian populations have the potential of being affected in the extent that they 
can be offered protections in armed conflicts, partially due to the debate and difficulty in identifying a 
clear definition for PMSC in light of existing IHL. Further, as many of the obligations and standards that 
guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSC, it raises concerns that sta-
tes might simply outsource their military policy to PMSC without taking adequate measures to promote 
compliance with IHL even in light of there theoretical obligation to do so.14 It is worth noting at this 
juncture the difference between in possibilities, not probabilities, where no study currently proves that 
a PMSC is more likely to perpetrate illicit acts than a member of a sovereign force. The perception of 
this being the case is due in part to the tendency of the media outlets to focus only on specific instances 
where this has occurred.
A) Mercenaries
10. Although there is a debate of the definition of PMSC as civilians or combatants under IHL, 
what is practically undeniable is that the legal parameters as they relate to mercenaries do not apply to 
the sector. It tends to occur, especially in journalistic pieces, that the term PMSC and mercenary are used 
synonymously.15 Although this commonly occurs, it does not truly represent reality. The term mercenary 
could be employed to demonstrate the disapproval of the author instead of as a reference to specific 
international legal criteria that have been met.16 Due to the fact that the use of the term mercenary can 
imply negative connotations, and its association with PMSC can influence the debate on the regulation 
of the sector, it is important to clarify the difference between the colloquial use and parameters given to 
the definition according to international law.17
11. Different from the colloquial use, the legal definition of a mercenary has its base in Art. 47 
dom’’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 54, 2005, pp. 687; G.	aBrahaM, “The Contemporary 
Legal Environment”, The Privatisation of Security in Africa, South African Institute of International Affaires, 
1999, pp. 97.
12  k.	Fallah, “Corporate Actors: The Legal Status of Mercenaries in Armed Conflict”. International Review 
of the Red Cross. ICRC, no. 863, 2006, pp. 601.
13  “Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law in a Changing Environment  and the Role of the 
United Nations”, Concept Note: 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Federal Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, Switzerland, 2009, pg. 1
14  h.	tonkin, “Common Article 1: A Minimum Yardstick for Regulating Private Military and Security Com-
panies”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol.22, Cambridge University Press, 2009
15  See for example: J.	scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, Nation 
Books: 2007; l.	wayne, “America’s For-Profit Secret Army”, New York Times, 13 Oct 2003; s.	creehan, “Sol-
diers of Fortune 500 International Mercenaries”, Harvard International Review, Winter 2002; M. Lee Lanning, 
Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today’s Private Military Companies, Presidio Press, 
2005.
16  a.	claphaM, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 299–300.
17  l.	caMeron, International Humanitarian Law and Regulation of Private Military Companies, Basel Insti-
tute of Governance, 2007, pp. 6.
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of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (PGC-I), which regulates their use by sta-
tes.18 To be considered a mercenary in accordance with Art. 47.2 of the PGC-I an individual must meet 
all of the cumulative criteria enumerated in the multifaceted article. As has been well established, the 
parameters outlined in the treaty produce a very narrow definition, to the point that it has been argued 
that it becomes unworkable.19 The greatest complication in the application of this article comes from 
its cumulative nature, whereby not meeting the terms of one section can free an individual from being 
legally defined as a mercenary.20 Hence the probability of finding someone who meets all of the criteria, 
much less within in the PMSC industry, seems complicated if not impossible.21 
B) Civilian & Combatant
12. Having established that it is improbable that any PMSC meets the legal definition of a mer-
cenary, one must examine the legal definition of a PMSC as either a civilian or a combatant under IHL. 
It is important to note that the law establishes a distinctive line that is mutually exclusive, where an 
individual can only be one or the other. 22 Therefore any concept that alludes to a partial status of quasi-
combatant or semi-civilian can be dispensed with.23 That said, finding an otherwise clear and general fit 
of the PMSC into the civilian or combatant legal categories is a nuanced task. 
13. In this instance a general conclusion is first hindered by the fact that the legal status under IHL 
is dependent on the contractual relationship between the company and the client and the type of services 
provided.24 It becomes an additionally complex process due to the fact that a base guideline in IHL is 
the relationship between the PMSC and the military chain of command and the command responsible.25 
In this instance each state has the capacity to determine the relationship between a contracted PMSC 
and the military chain of command under its specific domestic jurisdiction. Additionally PMSC who 
have contractual relationships with states do not necessarily have that relationship with the Ministry of 
Defense or the armed forces. In these situations the relationship between the contractor and the military 
chain of command is something more removed and more difficult to pinpoint.26 Thus, many opine that 
18  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. In relation to the impact of the article see: t.	
Milliard, “Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies”, 
Military Law Review, vol. 176,  2003. pp. 67; s.	Gul, “The Secretary Will Deny All Knowledge of Your Actions: 
The Use of Private Military Contractors and the Implications for State and Political Accountability”, Lewis & 
Clark Law Review, 2006, pp. 294.
19  F.J.	haMpson, “Mercenaries: Diagnosis before Prescription”, Netherlands Yearbook of Internacional Law, 
1991, pg, 14-16; G.	aldrich, ‘‘Guerrilla combatants and prisoner-of-war status’’, American University Interna-
tional Law Review, vol. 31, 1982, pp. 881.
20  For a discussion on the weaknesses of the norms as they relate to mercenaries see: d.	kasseBauM, “A 
Question of Facts- The legal use of Private Security Firms in Bosnia”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
no. 38.3, 2002; walker	&	whyte, “Contacting Out War? Private Military Companies, Law and Regulation in the 
United Kingdom”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, No. 54.3, 2005
21  Infra note 7, pp.524.
22  Art. 48—Basic Rule. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. “In order to ensure respect for 
and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accord-
ingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”
23  See c.	pilloud,	y.	sandoz,	c.	swinarski,	B.	ziMMerMann, Commentary on the additional protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,  International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, pp. 515
24  e.c.	Gillard, “Business goes to war: Private military/security companies and international humanitarian 
law”, International Review of the Red Cross, ICRC, vol. 88. No. 863, 2006, pg. 530
25  Article. 43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
26  The scope of these relationships is something that is debated even at internal levels of states. See USA vs. 
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the classifications of combatants created so long ago can be incompatible in treating the modern pheno-
mena of companies in the PMSC sector.27 
14. That said, IHL establishes under Art. 50 of the PGC-I, that in a situation of doubt, whomever 
does not fit into the established combatant categories is to be defined as a civilian.28 Thus by default an 
exhaustive analysis, where only brief key points are mentioned above, leads to the conclusion that the 
majority of employees of PMSC can be considered civilians, especially when under contract with an 
entity that is not a state party to a conflict.29 Taking this into account, one can further examine if a PMSC 
could be defined as a civilian that accompanies the armed forces without being members thereof under 
Art.4(A)4 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC-III).30 But 
in a brief examination of this article, it must be noted that while several of the support functions that 
companies in the sector provide could fit within the reach of Art. 4(A)4 of the GC-III, there exits many 
more, particularly functions closer to the nucleus of military operations, that most likely do not fit wi-
thin the article’s reach.31 This, combined with other facets of the application of the article, then adds a 
further level of complication in establishing a clear, concise and generally applicable definition within 
the parameters of the treaties.
2. Human Rights Instruments
15. Aside from the difficulty in the concise application of IHL seen briefly above, the nuanced 
nature of various state relationships with the PMSC industry also effects the application of human rights 
law. As of late the parameters of the discussion of human rights has been extended to include the role 
of corporations, thus alluding to the possible application to the PMSC sector.32 But the international 
community is still in the preliminary phases of adapting human rights to more effectively protect indivi-
duals and communities from the damages of these rights by corporations.33 Although it is in preliminary 
stages, the analysis related to the PMSC sector helps in providing a more ample image of the complex 
international legal framework that surrounds the industry. 
16. Although nothing has been decided in its respect to date, in the context of this ongoing 
discussion on the application of human rights many opine that non-state agents, especially those 
that execute functions of a governmental nature, also have to respect human rights norms.34 But, 
Slough, Slatten, Liberty, Heard & Ball, CR-08-360, District of Colombia, 8 Dec 2008. 
27  r.	MorGan, “Professional Military Firms under International Law”, Chicago Journal of International 
Law, Summer 2008.
28  Art. 50, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977
29  See similar conclusion reached by e.c.	Gillard, Private Military/Security Companies: The Status of their 
Staff and their Obligations under International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibility of States in Relation to 
their Operations, Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, ICRC, 2005, pp. 6.
30  Art.4(A)4: “Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units 
or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization 
from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card 
similar to the annexed model.” Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 Au-
gust 1949.
31  e.c.	Gillard, Private Military/Security Companies: the Status of their Staff and their Obligations under 
International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their Operations, Presentation 
held at the governmental experts’ workshop, Switzerland, 2006. Pg. 6
32  For a general summary of this line of discussion see: s.	JerBi, “Business and Human Rights at the UN: 
What Might Happen Next?”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2009
33  J.	ruGGie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, pg. 3
34  International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and differences, Ad-
visory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, 2003
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the application of this area of international law also faces complications, due partially to the fact 
that human right focuses on, and requires, the action of a state.35 As the application of human rights 
instruments revolves around the state, the largest impediment in the application to the PMSC sector 
is the varied state-company relationships that exist. Of these one must consider a relationship with 
the contracting state, another with the territorial state where the service is provided, and yet another 
with the state of legal constitution of the corporate structure of the PMSC. One can also speak of a 
relationship that exists between the state of nationality of the employees of the PMSC. 
17. Within the context of these varied relationships, the biggest impediment to the application 
of human rights is that the legal opinions are still not clear as to which of these states hold the human 
rights due diligence obligation.36 For the incorporating state, there is a lack of jurisprudence to allow the 
state to impose its obligation and responsibility of control over the company constituted in its territory.37 
Additionally, in the few instance where domestic regulation exists, there is a very high threshold to 
prove that that regulation is defective to the point that it results in failure of the state to comply with its 
due diligence responsibilities.38 Combined with this, the instability that is frequently found in the states 
where PMSC operate almost annuls the capacity of those states to protect human rights within their bor-
ders. Furthermore, the application of universal jurisdiction fails to be an effective tool due to the costs 
and lack of information privy to the state whose nationals are employed by PMSC.39
3. Additional Issue of Control
A) Principal-Agent Problem
18. The increased use of PMSC demonstrates that sovereign state are in the process of exchanging 
classic forms of authority for a new form of control and an operational structure that is based in dele-
gation and supervision.40 The delegation in the context of this article relates to tasks of a security and 
military nature provided by the PMSC. In essence the PMSC do what the State possibly ought to, or in 
some instance had done, but in currently not willing or capable of doing. This article takes the position 
that the central theme in this delegation is not related to privatization, which can be taken as fact, but 
rather to the control and the responsibility of a new executing entity. These issues of responsibility and 
control are compounded by the intrinsic deficiencies found within a principal-agent relationship esta-
blished by delegation, especially in instances where vigilance and control are hindered by information 
asymmetries.41
35  l.	dickinson, “Accountability of Private Security Contractors under International & Domestic Law”, ASIL 
Insights, vol.11, issue 31, 2007; c.	droeGe, Private Military and Security Companies and Human Rights: A rough 
sketch of the legal framework, Swiss Initiative on PMSC/PSCs, Workshop, 16-17 January 2006.
36  Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors: Status & State Responsibilities for the Actions, The Uni-
versity Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 2005, pp. 35.
37 	c.	lehnardt, “Private Military Companies and State Responsibility”, International Law & Justice Work-
ing Paper, no. 2007/2, 2007, pp. 19; c.	ortiz, “Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding 
business of commercial security provision’’, in k.	van	der	piJl	et	al, Global Regulation: Managing Crises after 
the Imperial Turn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 217-218
38  M.C. v. Bulgaria EctHR ap# 39272/98, 4 Dec 2003, Para. 169-170; r.l.	powell, “The Right to Security 
of Person in European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence”, European Human Rights Law Review, Sweet & 
Maxwell, vol.6, 2007,pp. 662-665
39  B.	perrin, “Promoting compliance of private security and military companies with international humani-
tarian law”, International Review of the Red Cross, ICRC, vol. 88, num 863, Sept 2006, pp. 619
40 	c.	ortiz, “Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding business of commercial secu-
rity provision’’, in k.	van	der	piJl	et	al, Global Regulation: Managing Crises after the Imperial Turn, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004, pp. 205
41  G.k.	yarrow	&	p.	Jasiński. Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Taylor & Francis, 
1996, pp. 48 (on profit maximization vs. public good); p.	Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-
Military Relations, Harvard University Press, 2003,pp. 55; MJr.	J.	Mckay, “Review: Armed Servants”, Canadian 
Army Journal, vol. 8.3, Fall 2005, pp. 117.
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19. Additionally, the principal-agent problem has a second level in the delegation of power from 
the state to the private company. It is very common that the private company outsource certain service 
to another entity in the specific geographic area of operation, especially one with local knowledge and 
know-how.42 Although it is in the best interest of the PMSC to implement best practices and procedures 
within the context of this subcontracting, the company may find itself facing the same control and mo-
nitoring issues with the second company as the state with the PMSC, where the agent eludes contractual 
responsibilities and the principal is faced with a lack of information permitting full knowledge and 
transparency of exactly what is occurring on the ground. 
B) Complex and Transnational Nature of the Industry
20. Compounded by the legal and control issues outlined above, the complex and transnational 
nature of the PMSC industry is a dynamic variable that itself hinders the creation of effective regulation. 
Much of PMSC activity occurs outside of the borders of the country of corporate incorporation, as well 
as outside of the territory of the contracting state. This transnational scope, as related to the principal-
agent issues, can be found in the great levels of difficulty in testing and proving that a PMSC operations’ 
are in line with domestic and international norms, as well as the contract in itself. The state of incorpo-
ration can face extraterritorial impediments, while the state where the operations occur faces issues with 
how to monitor and control a foreign entity. The transnational element of the PMSC sector also implies 
that the contracting state may also lack the full monitoring capacity of the contract. This can be fur-
ther exacerbated when one speaks of inequality between governments. Asymmetries exist between the 
approaches of distinct governments towards the industry, as well as between the power of the industries 
in different countries. Additional variations also exist between the structures of political culture and its 
influence on the policy formation and legislative process.
21. In the cases where the transnational nature of the industry may not present large constraints, 
the makeup of the PMSC sector in itself can present impediments. The reality of the heterogeneous 
industry, providing a variety of services, can complicate the process in identifying the PMSC subject, 
due not only to the variation in corporate structures but also the nuanced complexities of the sector on a 
whole.  The complex corporate structures that exist in the industry can inhibit the creation of universally 
applicable regulatory parameters. Efficient regulation is thus hindered, as it must treat various types of 
services as well as various organizations as the legal subject imparting those services. 
22. To complicate this one step further, the PMSC sector has undergone numerous mergers and 
acquisitions as of late. Due to this, many PMSC are now part of massive corporate structures, where 
the overall entity may be diversified into numerous markets unrelated to security or military services.43 
Thus the market reality is that many PMSC can be found within multi-leveled corporate structures with 
vast diversification. Thus, any applicable regulation must have a component to identify the actual entity 
realizing the services of a military or security nature within what could be a massive global organization 
diversified into distinct and non-related markets. As Ortiz notes, not all of the operations of these corpo-
rations can be treated and regulated as if they were PMSC functions.44
42  s.narFeldt	&	n.	cheadle, “Act Globally, Hire Locally”, Journal of International Peace Operations, vol. 
5, 2009 (Proposes that the local contracting ratio for operations in Chad are between 60% and 80%); J.J.	Messner, 
Testimony, EU Parliamentary Cmte Meeting: Human Rights (DROI), A3G3, Brussels, 9 Feb 2009. (Estimating 
that 99.7% of the employees in Afghanistan are Afghanis).
43  See for example MPRI as a division of L-3 Communications as of 2003, http://www.mpri.com/esite/index.
php/content/about/mpri_history; DynCorp’s acquisition by Computer Sciences Corporation, “CSC Completes Ac-
quisition of DynCorpp”, Press Release, http://www.csc.com/investor_relations/press_ releases/1209-computer_
sciences_corporation_completes_acquisition_of_dyncorp
44  Infra note 40, pp. 208
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C) Conclusion
23. This section has established the problems in relation to the application of international law 
and the effective supervision and control of the PMSC. It has briefly demonstrated that although the 
probability of finding a PMSC that can be legally defined as a mercenary is low, the capacity in applying 
the definitions, and related obligations and restrictions, established by IHL of a civilian or combatant is 
taxing. This is in part due to the fact that the established legal parameters related to older combat con-
texts. Additional impediments are rooted in the ability of each sovereign state to define their contractual 
relationship with the PMSC and how that relates to the established command structure of their armed 
forces. The section has further highlighted the issues under discussion as they relate to the application 
of human rights obligations to corporate entities, where the PMSC case is complicated due to the varied 
relationships that exist between numerous state actors.
24. The intrinsic problems of control in a principal-agent relationship created by delegation have 
also been shown. It has been further demonstrated that the transnational nature of the industry combi-
nes with these principal-agent problems in creating greater probabilities of information asymmetries 
amongst parties. The transnational operational scope of the PMSC sector further complicates a clear 
regulatory framework due to the complex corporate structures from which PMSC operate, which are 
diversified into various services sectors that often combine military and security related services with 
unrelated sectors within a single global entity.
25. Having established the current issues faced in the regulation of the PMSC sector, the article 
now turns to the specific issues related to the development of policy content. Looking first at the weak-
ness in the classic state-centric model and then turning to an alternative approach through the application 
of Bottom-Up Lawmaking to the regulatory issues.
III. Policy Formation
26. With the general understanding of the weaknesses in the current international regulatory fra-
mework of the PMSC sector, one may turn to the possible modes of rectifying this situation through the 
formation of new policy proposals. In doing so it would appear as though the classic model of policy 
creation where the state has a monopoly on the process does not seem to meet the needs. This section 
will first examine the obstacles confronted by the classic model as it applies to the regulation of PMSC 
and then look to the application of Bottom-Up Lawmaking as an alternative in the process.
1. Issues with Classic State-Centric Model 
27. The classic approach of policy formation places the state in the position of the central actor 
with a monopoly on the process.45 The creation of policy content under this model in relation to the 
PMSC sector seems to be hindered by two central factors. The first being a possible lack of political will 
on behalf of the states, and the second being a lack of a full understanding of the industry in order to 
approach the policy formation process.
A) Political Will
28. Let us first turn to the issue of political will in the state centric policy formation process. 
Firstly, in terms of delegation on behalf of the state, although it is evident that effective contracting re-
quires superior monitoring and evaluation of the contracted entity, the political will to activate the regu-
latory process has been frequently absent.46 There are some that doubt, in a similar vein to the formation 
45  See GoldsMith	&	posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.13.
46  s.	perlo-FreeMan	&	e.	sköns, “The Private Military Services Industry”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and 
Security, no. 2008/1, 2008
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of mercenary policy on the international level, that the states lack the desire to regulate the sector, at least 
at a multilateral level in the forum of international law.47 The principle argument is that the state wants 
to ensure a margin of maneuverability in the contracting and use of PMSC. Combined with this, other 
States who at present may not be using PMSC, may seek to ensure that the option is available to them in 
the future. Due to this, until very recently, the levels of political will have been lacking. 
29. It is true although that a limited number of states have taken steps within their domestic le-
gislative spheres to establish modes of regulation.48 These initiatives could be rooted in the fact that the 
process and ability to change domestic regulation is frequently less of a labyrinth than on the internatio-
nal level, thus leaving the state viable room to maneuver within the domestic forum. But, in the instances 
where domestic regulation exists, it has many times been in the form of reactive policy, only in response 
to an embarrassing situation for the state.49 
B) State Misconception of Established Risk and Sector Realities
30. That said, the possible lack of political will is a variable that could change, especially bearing 
in mind the increase in the use and growing recognition of the utility that PMSC offer. In the case that 
the political will to begin the regulatory formation process exists, other issues can feasibly present them-
selves in relation to the creation of legislative proposals to be debated and negotiated in the international 
forum. Specifically, it has been noted that too many of the proposals on ways to better regulate the sector 
have been based on myths or exaggerations that lack the support of correct information.50 Additionally 
the process could see parallels with some forms of domestic regulation where policy proposals could be 
written in a more reactive tone as a result of a specific incident. This in turn would result in proposals 
that only focus on part of the bigger and more intricate problem.51 Therefore, aside from the political 
will to being the process, problems exist in the capacity of the existing system in formulating proposals 
that are based in established risks and integral realities to the entire vast PMSC sector. The capacity of 
the state to identify these core, and overarching issues, may also be rooted in the aforementioned trans-
national scope and complexity of the heterogeneous industry. The increase in the number of think-tanks 
and research centers publishing reports focusing on strategic aspects inherent in the privatization of 
security and military outsourcing featuring PMSC as central players, could attest to the need to educate 
the political actors on the areas of the sector where they lack a full understanding.52
31. Thus the fact that the State is not always in the position to begin the process of the develop-
ment of policy proposals, combined with the complexity of the sector and the quantity and diversifica-
tion of the actors resulting in policy proposals that do not effectively treat the realities or the full scope 
of the issues, makes the investigation of possible alternative sources of such proposals for a more clear 
and solid regulation interesting. If the impetus of the State is low, the magnitude of the issues with the 
regulation of PMSC obligates the exploration of these alternative sources. Thus, the following section 
of this article applies an alternative theory as it relates to the sources of policy content in the formation 
of law, specifically investigating if the professional associations of the PMSC sector that could be viable 
sources of inspiration for future regulation.
47  For a discussion of the lack of political will associated with mercenary regulations see: s.	Goddard, The 
Private Military Company: A Legitimate International Entity within Modern Conflict, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001, pp. 37 
48  See a comprehensive list of domestic regulation: PMSC Regulation Database, Resource for the Regulations on 
Private Military and Security Companies, DCAF. http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/pmsc-regulation-database
49  J.	spear, Market Forces: The Political Economy of Private Military Companies, New Security Programme, 
FAFO Report 531, 2006, pp. 44
50  Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities, Human Security Bulletin. The Canadian Consor-
tium on Human Security, vol. 6, issue 3, March, 2008, pp. 18
51  Regulating the Private Commercial Military Sector, Workshop Report, Institute for International Law and 
Justice, New York University School of Law, Dec 2005, pp. 2
52  See for example the compilation of actors listed at www.privatemilitary.org/thinktanks.html
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Marzo 2010), Vol. 2, Nº 1, pp. 44-72
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
54
stephanie	Brown Bottom-up Lawmaking and the regulation of private...
IV. Sources of Regulation: Bottom-Up Lawmaking
1. Initial Considerations
32. The State has been the central actor in the classic formation of international law, where the po-
licy formation process is led from above by the political elite, especially the Executive.53  But the study of 
international law is currently diversifying in the techniques, methods and theories on policy formation and 
the role of the key actors involved in the process.54 Taking into account the possible lack of political will on 
behalf of the State in being the source for the preliminary steps of the policy formation process as it relates 
to PMSC or the possible lack of a full understanding on behalf of the state of the full depth and breadth 
of the PMSC industry to a degree that makes the formation policy proposals possible, the variations in the 
approaches of the study of the formation of regulatory parameters present and interesting path by which to 
examine alternative sources of norm creation as it relates to the PMSC control and responsibility issues.
2. Bottom-Up Lawmaking Theory
33. One such theory is Bottom-Up Lawmaking (BUL), developed through the research of J. Levit 
in relation to the international financial sector.55 BUL looks at the formation of legal instruments as a 
process that flows in the opposite direction from the classical approaches, being the top-down formation 
of law that, in the words of Levit, is internalized into practice.56 BUL on the other hand describes an 
organic process centered in private actors that complete a process of codification of group norms based 
in experience and practices in their respective sector. What occurs is that these practice-based norms are 
“externalized” and hardened in the form of law at a state level.
34. BUL begins with a relatively small homogenous group of active members of a specific sector 
that institutionalizes into an identifiable entity. This group creates a set of substantive internal rules, in 
essence organic norms based in and emanating from the day-to-day experiences of the members. The 
norms reflect and simultaneously condition the behavior of that sector through the creation of an inter-
nal governing system that regulates members’ conduct. To achieve this the group establishes procedural 
measures and remedies that strengthen these rules, but at the same time permit the possibility to modify 
the internal norms, which assures their proximity to the pertinent issue to the sector.
35. The practice based norms, although “soft” in the sense of international law between states 
when they exist at the level of these private groups, over time terminate formally aggregated into formal 
legal systems via the aggregation of their content by the inter-state system. BUL breaks this aggregation 
into general types-- vertical, making reference to regional or domestic systems, and horizontal, referring 
to the connection with the international institutions and instruments.57 BUL presents two possible causes 
for this aggregation, being either efficiency due to the inherent advantages of a system of norms based 
in the technical and practical experience of members of a sector, or the advocacy on behalf of the group 
for the acceptance and official adoption of their norms.58
53  GoldsMith	&	posner, Infra note 46.
54  ratner	&	slauGhter identify 7 methodologies, ratner	&	slauGhter, “Symposium On Method In Interna-
tional Law: Appraising the Methods of International Law”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, no. 2, 
1999; Variations New Haven School see: M.	McdouGal	&	w.M.	reisMan, The International Law Essays: A Supple-
ment to International Law in Contemporary Perspective, Foundation Press:1988; International Law & Economics- 
J.l.	dunoFF	&	J.p.	trachtMan, “Economic Analysis of International Law”, Yale Journal of International Law. vol. 
24, no.1, 1999; International Law, a.M.	slauGhter	et	al, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship”, American Journal of International Law, no. 92,1998
55  Complete works of Janet	koven	levit: http://www.law.utulsa.edu/facbib/134/
56  J.	levit, Infra Note 3, pp. 395. 
57  J.	levit, “The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Offi cially Sup-
ported Export Credits”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 45, 2004, pp. 119.
58 	J.	levit, “A Cosmopolitan View of Transnational Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Case of Export Credit In-
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36. In essence BUL refutes as false assumptions certain aspects of the classic study of the forma-
tion of international law, such as the state as the sole and primary actor in the policy formation process, 
and that it is a process orchestrated from the above by the political elite.59 What BUL represents is the 
diffusion on a global level of the process of formation of law into multiple sources and overlapping 
processes that end in the creation of state level instruments.60 The examples of BUL are not limited to 
official acts or diplomatic and political agreements as is the case in most of the classical study; it focu-
ses on the daily practices of a myriad of transnational actors such as private individuals and specialized 
technocrats.61 It is imperative to note that the theory does not attempt to replace or substitute the classic 
process; in BUL’s perspective they are processes that operate in tandem.62 What BUL describes is a rea-
lity where the state does not have the monopoly of the formation of law, but still plays an integral role 
in the policy formation process.63
3. Case Study: Bern Union
37. BUL has been applied to the formation of legal instruments related to export subsidies, cli-
mate change, social corporate responsibility initiatives and letters of credit.64 Taking export subsidies 
as an example, the investigation into the formation of what ended as part of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, started with a group of friends in a bar in Bern in 1934. This 
group, made up of export credit insurers, decided to share information on their claims experiences in 
the aim of establishing best practices.65 With the passage of time this group formally constituted itself 
as the Bern Union.66
38. With the global increase in the use of these financial instruments after World War II, the 
members used their half-yearly group meetings to continue sharing experiences and practices. They co-
dified the obligations and guiding principles related to the conduct of members in the Union’s General 
Understanding (General Understanding).67 This General Understanding produced what BUL describes 
as a self-sufficient and self-executing legal community.68 Thus the Union transformed from a simple 
commercial association into a regulatory entity, with the goal of mitigating abusive practices in the 
sector by members.
39. The principles of the General Understanding reflect the collective beliefs on how members 
should carry out their business, producing a regulatory matrix that translated the daily work experiences 
of the members into a set of technical rules.69 But, it must be noted that as a private association the mem-
bers are not legally bound to the principles, which at the same time do not produce rights.70 Nevertheless, 
surance”, Wayne Law Review, vol. 51, 2006 pg. 1197; J.	levit, “Bottom-up Lawmaking Through Pluralist Lends: 
The ICC Banking Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit” Emory Law Journal. Vol. 
57: 2008. Pg. 1153
59  See discussion on Intsrumentalism of political leaders, Ibid, pp. 13
60  M.	reisMan, “The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes and the Dif-
ferences in Their Application”, in wolFruM	&	roBen, Developments of International Law in Treaty Making, 
Springer, 2005. Pp. 16; J. Levit. Infra note 3, pp. 395
61 	J.	levit, “A Bottom-up Approach to International Law: the Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments”, Yale 
Journal of International Law, vol. 30, 2005, pp. 178
62  Ibídem. pp. 173
63  J.	levit, “A Cosmopolitan View of Transnational Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Case of Export Credit In-
surance”, Wayne Law Review, vol. 51, 2006, pp. 1199
64  J.	levit, “International Law Happens (Whether the Executive Likes It Or Not)”, in R. Saba. El Poder 
Ejecutivo. Editores del Puerto, 2007.
65  See current member list: http://www.berneunion.org.uk/bu_profiles.htm
66  About Bern Union: History, http://www.berneunion.org.uk/history.html
67  Bern Union Guiding Principles, http://www.berneunion.org.uk/guiding-principles.html
68  J.	levit, Infra note 63, pp 2000
69  J.	levit, Infra note 3, pp 401
70  Infra note 67
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although the General Understanding lacks the technical title of state level law, Levit’s research has de-
monstrated that it functions in the same way.71 The members follow the established rules, incorporating 
them into their policies. When it happens that a member does not adhere to those rules, her research has 
shown that they are subject to informal sanctions within the context of the group, which in turn act as a 
control mechanism over possible infractions.72
40. The effective control of the General Understanding of the Bern Union has resulted in the 
adoption of their content by formal state level institutions and agreements, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), thus fol-
lowing the process laid out by BUL. This example of content aggregation into formal legal instruments 
occurred via two general stages. First, the OECD incorporated the substantive rules, procedures and 
structure of the General Understanding into the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
(Arrangement) in 1978.73 At this juncture the content of the Understanding could continue to be defined 
as “soft” due to the fact that the OECD Arrangement was a gentlemen’s agreement, although it received 
administrative support form the Secretariat of the OECD.74 But for Levit and others it could be described 
as a norm that acted as if it was international law formed between states.75 
41. Following this, in 1994 the WTO Uruguay Round completed the path of the substantive rules 
to formal international law in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Agreement).76 
In this instance the content of the OECD Arrangement was incorporated into the WTO treaty, where it 
creates a legal provision that serves to ease or eliminate the violation of the Agreement if a Party can 
demonstrate that they operated in accordance with the parameters of:
“…an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve original 
Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which 
has been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest 
rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity 
with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.”77
42. Hence, Levit’s research has demonstrated that in various instances, such as the example of 
the WTO and the Bern Union, this style of private association can create norms that begin lacking the 
definition of formal state level law but that end up being adopted and strengthened by formal entities 
and agreements at the inter-state level. For this reason, this article applies the parameters of the theory 
of BUL to the associations in the PMSC industry to see if the private associations meet the requirements 
to be possible sources of regulatory norms in relation the sector.
V. The Application of Bottom-Up Lawmaking to the PMSC Sector
1. Initial Considerations
43. The previous section delineated three general phases of the formation process of law accor-
ding to BUL: (1) the institutionalization of the group in order to share their experiences and best practi-
71  Following the definition of Art. 2, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
72  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 153-156
73  Ibid, pp. 166-167. Examples. “notice and Match” and “transaction starting time”; Arrangement on Offi -
cially Supported Export Credits, Official Unclassified OECD Document TAD/PG(2009)6
74  See J.	laJuGie, “Soft Law Hard Results”, The Export Credit Arrangement 1978/1998: Achievements and 
Challenges, OCDE, 1998, pp. 107; Art. 2. del TAD/PG(2009)6.
75  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 164-165; J. Ray, “The arrangement from the inside”, The Export Credit Ar-
rangement 1978/1998: Achievements and Challenges, OCDE, 1998.
76  See WTO Gateway on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
scm_e/scm_e.htm
77  Ibidem. Anexo I(k). Marrakech Agreement; Anexo 1A y Art. 3, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures; J. Levit. Infra note 61, pp. 165
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ces; (2) the creation of substantive practice based rules that create a procedural system of interpretation 
and remedy over the behavior of the members; (3) the adoption of those internal norms into the sphere 
of classic state centric law. In order to prove if the associations of the PMSC sector meet the parameters 
of the theory, the underlying aspects of these phases must be identified and examined. 
44. In the first instance the associations must represent an organization that is rightfully institutio-
nalized as an entity with a mission that is clearly defined. Subsequently the institution must be compri-
sed of a group of members that demonstrate a certain level of professional homogeneity, with a process 
by which the selection of new members is critically judged in relation to having the same characteristics. 
This process of control and inspection prior to approval of new members creates a style of private “club” 
amongst this homogenous group as it is closed to the masses.78
45. Secondly, the homogenous group must share perspectives and practical professional experien-
ces that guide the formation of an internal norm structure that regulates the behavior of the members 
within the professional field. BUL establishes that in order for this system to function, it must also con-
tain judicial procedures and capacities to act as an adjudicator between members. Within this system 
repeated interaction of the members’ acts as a motivating force that produces incentives for members to 
follow the norms. 
46. The following analysis examines to what degree the IPOA and the BAPSC meet these as-
pects of BUL. It begins looking to prove that the organizations meet the criteria of institutionalization. 
From there the level of homogeneity amongst the members and the existence of a selection process for 
potential members that maintains this level must be present. The article then examines the existence of 
established norms, which in accordance with BUL must be tools for internal regulation of the activities 
of the members, based in the day-to-day experiences and expertise emanating from the daily participa-
tion in the sector. The analysis must also prove if these institutions contain a judicial and adjudicative 
system amongst the members. Given the fact that a precept of BUL is the aggregation of the content of 
the normative system of the association efficiency, and BUL espouses this to repeated interaction, the 
analysis also looks to prove if this exists amongst the members.
2. Institutionalization
47. The process that BUL describes begins with a homogenous private group brought together 
by common practices in their professional sector. In a determinate moment the group constitutes into a 
formal institution, expressed in statues where specific aims and purpose are contemplated.79 In order to 
prove the institutionalization of the two associations in question, when they were created, their structure, 
and mission within their statutes must be identified.
A) IPOA
48. The IPOA is a trade association headquartered in Washington. It is a nongovernmental not-
for-profit organization that is non-partisan.80 The starting point for its formation came from the ideas of a 
78  See keohane	&	nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Le-
gitimacy”, in Porter et al. Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2001
79  For an opinion on the moment and cause of institutionalization, see: d.	snidal, “Political Economy and 
International Institutions”, International Review of Law and Economy, vol. 16. no. 1, 1996; keohane	&	Mar-
tin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, International Security, vol. 20, no.1, 1995; kratochwil	&	ruGGie, 
“International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State”, International Organizations, vol. 40 no. 
4,1986.
80  “Endorsing Assocication” Iraqi Development Program, “Endorsing Assocication”, http://www.iraqdeve 
lopmentprogram.org. 
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group of individuals of the non-governmental, academic, business and legal sectors who worked in con-
flict zones and recognized the benefits that the private sector brings to the victims of conflict and people 
that live in post-conflict areas. In Sierra Leon in the 90s the group wrote a document outlining the best 
practices on how private business could be utilized in areas of conflict and reconstruction, with a strong 
belief in the ethical and economic efficiency of the sector.81 When the association was founded in April 
of 2001, this document acted as a base for the ethical foundation of the organization, today embodied in 
its Code of Conduct (CoC).82
49. The mission of the IPOA is to promote high operational and ethical standards in the compa-
nies active in the sector that they define as the “peace and stability industry.”83 The organization looks 
to create and take part in constructive conversations on the positive and growing contribution of the 
companies in the sector in the betterment of peace, development and security. The association also seeks 
to inform the greater public on the role and the activities of the industry.84
B) BAPSC
50. The BAPSC was constituted in February of 2006. It is an independent commercial associa-
tion, incorporated as private and limited organization under British law, headquartered in London. The 
association’s creation came from the realization on the part of a group of leaders in the private security 
sector in the UK that an urgent need existed to elevate operational standards and promote self-regulation 
of the sector.85 The mission of the organization is to promote, augment and regulate the interest and 
activities of the companies based in the UK who are providers of armed security services outside of 
the country. The BAPSC also represents the interests of the members in topics that relate to legislative 
proposals and actual legislation.86 The association’s mission and goal of self-regulation are embodied in 
the Charter.87
C) Conclusion
51. In applying the terms of BUL in relation to institutionalization to the two associations, it is 
proven that both organizations began with the interest of actors in the sector. The homogeneity in the 
founding group of the BAPSC is highlighted by the fact that they were private businesses in the sector 
that initiated the process of institutionalization. In the case of the IPOA, the base document created be-
fore institutionalization also counted with the support of members of the industry, although it came from 
a more diverse group of professionals. But, as the actual institutionalization of the association counted 
with the support of companies in the sector, it too fits the requirements of BUL. The analysis also de-
monstrates that the two institutions are formal private entities, and both share a mission of promoting 
best practices in the PMSC sector, embodied in their respective CoC or Charter. 
2. Members and Homogeneity
52. A key part to the BUL process is the homogeneity of the members of the group of practi-
tioners.88 This professional homogeneity, where for example the members auto identify themselves as 
belonging to the same sector, produces a critical mass of practical information and procedures gained 
81  See IPOA, History of the Code of Conduct, http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconducthistory.html
82  IPOA, About Us: History en http://ipoaonline.org
83  IPOA, About IPOA, http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/aboutipoa.html
84  Ibid
85  BAPSC, About Us, http://www.bapsc.org.uk
86  BAPSC, Key Documents: Charter en http://www.bapsc.org.uk
87  Ibid.
88  ellickson examines this phenomena in close knit groups and social norms. r.	ellickson, Order Without 
Law, Harvard University Press,1991
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from real experiences in the sector. It results in a general normative perception that is shared amongst 
the preferences of the group.89 Within each association the resources and practical experiences of the 
members act as a common core, not only in creating a systems of rules for the association based in 
practice, but also built on shared beliefs on a common objective, in this case the regulation of the 
PMSC sector.90 BUL also establishes that amongst the common attributes of the members, aside from 
emanating from the same sector, they must be private actors, not representatives of States.91
53. BUL dictates that the group homogeneity plays a role in the process of selection of new 
members, producing an institution with a configuration and aspects of a private “club.”92 By acting in a 
manner similar to a private club, this group of practitioners restricts access in a selective manner in ac-
cordance with internally established standards.93 Within the closed “club” atmosphere the reputation of 
the members becomes an important mechanism of control in mitigating deviation from the substantive 
norms in place amongst the group.94 
54. In relation to the associations in the PMSC sector, the research in the application of BUL must 
therefore show that the members of the associations in question are private actors who emanate from 
the same professional industry. It must also determine that the groups have established parameters in 
place for the admittance of new members, of which a fundamental obligation is that they come from the 
same sector. The creation of a closed “club”-like group will exist if the members share common interest 
originating from the necessities and obligations of the sector, and the inaccessibility of people who do 
not meet the requirements of admission to the established institution.
A) IPOA
a) Homogeneous Group
55. The IPOA has more than 60 members, made up of professional companies from the “con-
tingency contractor” sector connected to stability and peace missions.95 The IPOA breaks its members 
down into three industry categories: Logistics & Support Companies, Private Security Companies and 
Security Sector Reform and Development Companies. 96 These categories divide the members into two 
general categories of organizations whose primary commercial endeavor is either as a service provider 
or as a manufacturer.97 Thus, although the member companies of the IPOA provide various services with 
the diverse PMSC industry, where some provide services in more than one of the categories, all emanate 
from the same professional industry and act under contract in post-conflict and conflict zones. The tes-
timonies of some members attest to the homogeneity by auto identifying the association as “a coalition 
of companies from the sector.”98 The homogeneity of the members of the IPOA is accentuated by the 
89  For example, the groups in the financial sector in levit’s investigations accept the fundamental tenets of 
free trade in the context of open markets.
90  For discussion of the autonomy of the three groups in levit’s research see infra note 61, pp. 167. 
91  Group members can be state employees, but their interactions in the context of the group must be as private 
individuals, not state representatives. 
92  For an explication of the Club Model see:  keohane	&	nye, “The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation 
and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy”, in porter	et	al, Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral 
Trading System at the Millennium, Brookings Institution Press, 2001
93  The fact that the profession sectors usually have a common technical language also contributes to making 
them less accessible the outsiders, thus reinforcing the club like characteristics.
94  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 185
95  List of full members: http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/ipoamembers.html. 
96  d.	Brooks, Presentation: The Role of the Peace and Stability Industry in Peace Operations, The Humani-
tarian Development Summit, Oct. 2006, pp. 8; d.	Brooks, IPOA Presentation, Iraq Defence, Security & Commu-
nications Summit, Iraq Development Program, Dubai: Feb 2008, pp. 4
97  Levels of Corporate Memebrship. IPOA. http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/levelsofmembership.html
98  IPOA Membership: For Perspective Corporate Members: Member Testimonials: Blackwater USA, 
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fact that they have members active in all of the ongoing peace and stability operations in the world.99 
Additionally members represent a large section of the industry from various countries in the world.100
b) Membership Selection Process
56. The process to become a member of the IPOA is not automatic.101 The association admits new 
members based on an application and acceptance process, where standards are taken very seriously. 
Member companies are determined to allow only the most ethical and professional companies into the 
Association.102 The process begins with a simple, but formal, application that contains general company 
information and attests to their willingness to adhere to the organizations CoC.103 This information is 
submitted to the IPOA along with past performance information. From that point the company is subject 
to a series of interviews and a due diligence process by the Membership and Finance Committee.104 From 
the time that the due diligence process is complete, the Committee completes its own investigation of the 
potential member company. The applicant company is then notified as to whether their application has 
been successful. Upon acceptance, all new companies serve a mandatory six-month probationary period 
during which time they are allowed to participate in IPOA Committees but are not permitted to vote.105
B) BAPSC
a) Homogenous Group
57. Membership to the BAPSC is limited to security companies based in the UK who provide 
overseas armed security services.106 According to the BAPSC Charter, “armed services” is defined as 
any service that involves the recruitment, training, equipping, co-ordination, or employment, directly or 
indirectly of persons who bear lethal arms.107 This includes armed protective services, specialist consul-
ting services and security training services.  Under this definition, the members of the BAPSC would fall 
into the IPOA general definition of “PSC”, using the same definition and criteria but explicitly incorpo-
rating the necessity of lethal weapons.108 Aside from the geographic requirements, and that of a service 
that contemplates lethal weaponry, the BAPSC also limits the acceptance of complete membership to 
those companies willing and capable of demonstrating best practices and a commitment to maintain the 
standards of the organization.109 The capacity and willingness of the company to do so is verified through 
the membership application documentation examined in more detail below.
58. The homogeneity of the BAPSC members is not only interesting in terms of the organization 
itself, but also in terms of the industry on a whole. Of the almost 20 current members of the BAPSC, 
www.ipoaonline.org. It must be noted that as of 12 Oct 2007, Blackwater is ceased to be a member of the IPOA. 
http://ipoaonline.org/php/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=156
99  IPOA Annual Report: 2006-2007, pp. 8
100   Ibid, pp. 21
101  Ibid
102  IPOA: How the application process works, http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/applicationprocess.html
103  See IPOA Online application. http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/applicationonline.html
104  In 2005 this committee passed to the hands of the members, who from that point have carried out the 
process of admitting new members. The Committee is comprised of member companies who elect a Committee 
President in six-month rotations. See IPOA Annual Report: 2006-2007, pp. 18
105  Step 6. IPOA Membership Process. http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/applicationprocess.html
106  BAPSC, Membership: http://www.bapsc.org.uk/membership.asp
107  BAPSC, Charter, http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp
108  For companies with in the professional sector who do not fit the requirements to be official members, they 
can solicite to become associate members of the BAPSC.
109  BAPSC Self-Assessment Workbook, V.2.2. pp. ii , Membership: Membership Criteria. http://www.bapsc.
org.uk
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several coincide in membership with the IPOA.110 Thus further proving the homogeneity of the members 
as a part of a larger professional sector.
b) Membership Selection Process
59. The companies that meet the aforementioned requirements must petition to become members 
of the BAPSC, and are subject to the obligations that membership entails including the guiding prin-
ciples of the Charter of the organization.111 The BAPSC has two types of members—Provisional and 
Complete. The membership selection process is based on: the formal membership application form, 
Basic Checks, more detailed Due Diligence Documentation and the completion and revision by elected 
members of the BAPSC of a Self Assessment Workbook.112
60. The membership approval process is comprised of three phases, beginning with the demons-
tration of interest from the company. The company becomes a “Provisional Member” after it has de-
monstrated such interest and has been approved to continue in the membership process, submitting the 
required documentation. The Provisional Members are subject to the association’s Charter and benefit 
from membership privileges.113 After the formal application and additional documentation have been 
submitted, they are examined by the Membership Committee chaired by the Director General of the 
BAPSC and including executive members who are elected by the General Assembly.114 Full Member-
ship status is granted to the applicant company upon the final approval of the Committee, where the 
opportunity to appeal does exist if the application is denied.115
C) Conclusion
61. The investigation into the homogeneity of the two associations in question demonstrates that 
they meet the requirements established by BUL. Although the BAPSC and the IPOA place distinct pa-
rameters on the types of PMSC that can apply to become members, both associations are comprised of 
homogenous members from the same general industry. The fact that there is an overlap between the lists 
of members further proves the point. Additionally, these groups of private actors limit the access of new 
members through the membership application and approval process. During which the degree to which 
the applicant company meets the established membership requirements is tested. And the parameters 
must be met in order to allow them to share the title of member with the preexisting members. The in-
corporation of members into the decision making process on new members, combined with the fact that 
the application process is rigorous, it can be seen how the process reinforces the “club” like parameters 
of the group as defined by BUL, where new members are accepted in accordance with specific criteria 
relating to the industry in general.
3. Norm Creation and Internal-Regulation
A) Initial Considerations
62. Upon being institutionalized, BUL establishes that the organizations must act as more than 
a professional association that members use as a forum to disseminate technical abilities. To meet the 
requirements of BUL the association must also actively regulate its members operations, dictating rules 
110  See lists of full members at http://www.bapsc.org.uk/membership-list_of_members.asp & http://www.
ipoaworld.org/eng/ipoamembers.html
111  See BAPSC General Membership Information http://www.bapsc.org.uk
112  See BAOSC General Membership Criteria and related documentation at http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_
documents-membership_criteria.asp
113  BAPSC Self-Assessment Workbook. BAPSC. July 2007, pp. iv.
114  Ibid.
115  Ibid.
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on conduct.116 BUL prescribes that the group create a normative system of rules relating to the sector, 
the contents of which emanate from the practical experience gained from daily professional endeavors 
of the members. These substantive norms and standards reflect general aspect of the industry, the pro-
fessional practices and the expertise of the members. In essence it is the codification of practice-based 
rules that prescribe specific technical norms on the professional activities of the members.117 The prac-
titioners, whose daily participation in the sector provides an understanding of the technical details of 
the industry, create, interpret and enforce observance, that in turn govern said practices.118 These rules 
normally take the form of a CoC that the group uses as a barometer for other members.
63. Aside from the creation of the internal norms, BUL requires the establishment of procedures 
relating to the periodic revision, and where necessary alteration, of the norms. The goal of which is to 
maintain the corpus of rules as a living document that is pertinent to the sector and the members. Thus 
the evolution of the norms and innovation in the standards is assured to always be relative to the oppor-
tune problems facing the group as a whole. The capacity to reform the internally produced norms is 
especially important due to the fact that the institutionalization of the organization can add inertia to the 
substantive rules, increasing the risk that they lose relevance to the practices of the members.119
64. Thus, the application of BUL must begin by proving that these norms exist and that their ori-
gin is the daily practice of the members within the professional sector of the PMSC. It must analyze the 
enunciation of specific standards to follow and the goal of the CoC, being tools of a system of internal 
regulation of the members. In order to prove the capacity of the norms to regulate the members, the 
commitment the members make to follow the rules must be identifiable along with the mechanisms to 
monitor their compliance. Lastly, the analysis must demonstrate that periodic revision mechanisms on 
those norms exist.
B) IPOA
65. The substantive normative rules of the IPOA are embodied in its CoC that was first adopted 
in April of 2001 and in February of 2009 advanced to its twelfth version.120 As is well explained in its 
preamble, the CoC of the IPOA seeks to ensure the ethical standards of IPOA member companies ope-
rating in conflict and post-conflict environments so that they may contribute their valuable services for 
the benefit of international peace and human security.121 The latest CoC contains eleven articles related 
to the practices of the members, dealing with topics such as: human rights, transparency, responsibility, 
clients, employees and contract styles.
66. The IPOA is committed to ensuring that the CoC and its monitoring mechanisms maintain 
their relevance and effective capacity. The Standards Committee, comprised of volunteers from the 
member companies, is the axis of the maintenance, revision and vigilance of the proper application of 
the CoC amongst the members. It is within this committee that the members discuss compliance and 
promote consensus on best practices.122
67. In order to ensure the relevance and contemporaneous, the Committee engages in a yearly si-
mulation with case studies that represent pertinent and actual situations. After open discussion between 
members on the CoC’s application in those instances and possible solutions, the Committee invites 
116  For a discussion of this in relation to the  OCDE see: J. Levit. Infra note 57, pp. 77-82.; in relation to the 
Bern Union: J.	levit, Infra note 61. Pp. 149
117  J.	levit, Infra note 63, pp. 1197; J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 149-151
118  J.	levit, Infra note 63, pp. 1199
119  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 171
120  International Peace Operations Association: Code of Conduct: Version 12. http://ipoaworld.org
121  Ibid
122  IPOA Annual Report: 2006-2007, pp. 17
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members of other interested communities (such as human rights groups) to opine on the simulation and 
offer suggestion on how to improve the CoC.123
68. The organization also ensures the relevance of the CoC through an established review and 
reform process. The CoC is reviewed every two years where if changes are deemed necessary, the in-
ternal norms of the organization dictate the necessity of a vote of two-thirds majority of the members to 
replace the prior version.124 The IPOA not only accepts suggestions from members, but also opens the 
forum to the public during a limited time period. Although the public may make suggestions on possible 
modifications to the CoC, they are still subject to the aforementioned discussion and debate by members. 
That said, the IPOA strives to maintain the brevity of the CoC, to around two to three pages in general 
terms, in order to ensure its applicability, which would be difficult with a highly specified document due 
to the variations in the services and operating structures of the members within the PMSC industry.125
B) BAPSC
69. The Charter of the BAPSC contains the base elements that could evolve into a more formal 
CoC acting as the central focal point of the internal norms of the organization. The Charter of the as-
sociation dictates that the members completely accept and abide by the general obligations set forth in 
international, humanitarian and human rights law, the ethical codes of practice of the Association, and 
the aims and objectives of the Charter without reservation.126 Combined with these commitments the 
Charter contains ten individual principles under which the members make a commitment to be gover-
ned. The particular commitments include amongst other things: providing services based on defensive 
principals, properly training and equipping staff, and to avoid contracts that violate the law or infringe 
on political stability.127
70. The BAPSC strives to have its formal CoC ready in the near future. Its Standards Committee 
has been working with the British Standards Institute on the development of a normative document. The 
process has presented itself to be a bit slower than originally projected, due to the fact that the associa-
tion is looking to maximize the efficiency of the document, taking the opinions and commentaries of the 
members into account.128 A base document exists and deals with topics such as: recruitment, training, 
health and security of employees, insurance and accounting. Possible additional elements are under 
discussion, such as environmental factors.129
C) Conclusion
71. The analysis thus proves that the substantive rule for internal regulation exists in both asso-
ciations. In the case of the IPOA they are solidified in the CoC, where the BAPSC uses its Charter while 
the final CoC is being perfected. In both cases the substantive content comes from, and regulates, the 
operations of the members, and all members pledge to follow the parameters established there within. 
The monitoring of compliance is more evident in the case of the IPOA, in part due to the fact that the 
institution has a longer track record. This is similarly reflected in the norm modification process. 
4. Judicial Procedure and the Role as Adjudicator
A) Initial Considerations
123  Process explained in an interview with the President of the IPOA and the author.
124  IPOA Standards & Laws: Codes of Conduct: Public Consultation, www.ipoaonline.org
125  Infra note 123.
126  BAPSC. Key Documents: Charter. http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp
127  Ibid.
128  Opinion expressed by the Policy Director of the BAPSC in an interview with the author.
129  Ibid.
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72. Aside from the substantive rules established by the group, BUL also requires that a process 
exists for their interpretation. In this way when a member has a doubt or question in relation to the appli-
cation or the meaning of an internal norm, the group has the required mechanisms to answer established. 
In these instance the organization takes an advisory position on the interpretation of the rules, a quasi-
judicial position in the words of Levit.130 This is carried out by issuing opinions and policy declarations.
73. BUL also establishes that aside from the advisory position, BUL also dictates that system be 
self-executing, where those who make the substantive law also interpret and enforce them.131 In this 
position as adjudicator members who have a dispute in relation to the rules may turn to the association 
for its mediation or resolution. Thus the system of substantive internal norms is elevated to become a 
“closed” system due to the fact that members do not need to turn to an external entity to resolve disputes 
related to the internal norms. 
74. Hence, the investigation into the application of BUL to the IPOA and the BAPSC must exa-
mine if the associations take the position of interpreter and/or advisor for the members when a doubt or 
dispute exists on the internal norms. The organization must also have established steps to mediate and 
deflate these disputes.
B) IPOA
75. The role as an adjudicator of the IPOA is well established by the internal norms, embodied 
in the Enforcement Mechanisms of the Standards Committee.132 This mechanism is activated when the 
organization receives a complaint related to one of the member companies and their compliance with the 
CoC of the association.133 The Committee meets quarterly to review the placed complaints. With each 
complaint the Committee opens an ad hoc task force to review the content and the relevance to the CoC 
and that is it not specious.134 In order to ensure impartiality, no member of the task force can be affilia-
ted with the subject of the complaint.135 The group has thirty days to complete its investigation into the 
complaint.136 After that point they may opt to either refer the complaint to the Committee as a whole if 
it has merit, or dismiss it.137 
76. If the complaint is directed to the Committee, they may rule to impose corrective measures 
and sanctions or dismiss the complaint.138 The norms of the IPOA establish that the corrective measures 
prescribed by the Committee can include actions that alleviate the violation of the CoC, but may not be 
punitive in nature.139 The sanctions can include decided disciplinary actions, with the most severe being 
expulsion from the association.140
77. To date, the IPOA has received less than twelve complaints against its members.141 Given the 
frequency of global operations of the members, the experience of the IPOA has been that the work of the 
Standards Committee is more as an agent that identifies situations where noncompliance with the CoC 
130  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 171
131  Ibid, pp. 172.
132  IPOA Enforcement Mechanism v.1. http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/enforcementv01eng.html
133  It should be noted that the complaint process is open to members and the public in accordance with Art. 2.1 
of the Mechanism. One can easily lodge a complaint via a dedicated section of the IPOA website. The association 
takes the complaints that come from the public with the same level of seriousness as those from other members.
134  Art. 3.1 infra note 132.
135  Art. 3.2.1 infra note 132.
136  Art. 3.3 infra note 132.
137  Art. 3.4, 3.5 & 3.8 infra note 132.
138  Art. 4.2.4 infra note 132.
139  Art. 5.4 & 5.5 infra note 132.
140  Art. 5.6-5.10 infra note 132.
141  Infra note 123.
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could exist. The experience of the IPOA has been that the member companies are more than disposed to 
attend to and rectify an issue in the moment that the Committee informs them of a possible problem.142 
It is important to note that just as the CoC, the Control Mechanism originates in the internal norms of 
the IPOA and thus is not legally binding outside of the group. Due to the fact that the association lacks 
the characteristics of a judicial entity in international or domestic legal terms, the processes carried out 
by the Committee do not presuppose to prove innocence or guilt of the members in criminal or civil 
terms.143 
78. Aside from its role as an adjudicator in relation to the internal norms of the association, the 
IPOA is very active in issuing opinions and policy papers. The association not only publishes policy 
opinions, but also acts as a spokesperson for the members and as a representative of its interests in rela-
tion to interested government bodies. The IPOA further meets the advisory requirements of BUL by pu-
blishing research reports on legal issues that may affect its members. The Journal of International Peace 
Operations and the Peace Operations Institute (POI) carry out part of this research. Founded in 2006, the 
POI focuses on research, analysis and the promotion of discourse and dialogue on key subjects related 
to the industry.144 The aim of the POI is to present the challenges the sector faces within its operations 
and then make recommendations on effective remedies to those evolving challenges.145 
C) BAPSC
79. The BAPSC sees its role as an adjudicator of self-regulation and advisor to its members in 
three spheres: the standards established in the Charter, the eventual CoC and the training and advice 
they offer members in relation to the application of international law to members’ operations. For the 
moment the association may lack the capacity to be considered a “quasi-judicial” entity in terms of 
BUL. But, while the official CoC is being completed, the role of the BAPSC in relation to the violations 
of the Charter centers in the notification of members of a complaint, and ongoing communication with 
that member in order to reach a rectification of the situation if need be. The association has several tools 
available that include exercising pressure on members, imposing monetary sanctions, and or the suspen-
sion or limitation of the member’s rights.146 
80. The BAPSC notes that its members take the complaint process seriously, because it relates to 
the quality of their business, something they want to function well.147 At the same time the organization 
recognizes two impediments in realizing this function. First, due to the fact that a membership requi-
rement is off-shore operations, the distance can hinder the investigation efforts in relation to possible 
violations of the Charter.148 Secondly, the BAPSC is not privy to the details of the contracts signed bet-
ween its members and their clients, where they must request the utmost transparency on behalf of the 
members.
81. In relation to its role as the interpreter and advisor on legal issues, the BAPSC sees its position 
as essential to its members. This is due to the fact that members may very well be familiar with the cor-
pus of applicable international law, but from the standpoint of a different legal subject, i.e. as a member 
of the armed forces of a state, not a private contractor. For that reason the association promotes training 
142  Ibid.
143  Preamble Control Mechanism, Standards & Laws: Enforcement Mechanism, www.ipoaonline.org; The 
subordination of the internal system is also demonstrated in the fact that they suspend the process in the case that 
a civil or criminal case begins on the same subject.
144  Peace Operations Institute. About Us. http://peaceops.org
145  See By Laws Peace Operations Institute. http://peaceops.org
146  Bearpark	&	schulz, “The Regulation of the Private Security Industry and the Future of the Market”, in s.	
chesterMan	&	c.	lehnardt. From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Compa-
nies. Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.  248; Sanctions Section 9. Charter BAPSC.
147  Infra note 128.
148  Infra note 146.
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and consultations for members in relation to their obligations and responsibilities as a private actor.149 
This training can take the form of an obligation under Art. 2 of the Charter that requires that employees 
be trained to the standards commensurate with each assignment and in accordance with applicable laws 
of the appropriate country.150
82. The BAPSC also dictates policy papers and opinions as part of its functions. Their works fo-
cus on the topics related to the services and interest of the members as well as the regulation of the sector 
on a whole. The organization also disseminates works of other institutions that it feels are of particular 
interest to its members.151
D) Conclusion
83. Thus it is shown that the IPOA has a strong role as both an adjudicator and advisor to its mem-
bers. It has also been demonstrated that due to the young nature of the BAPSC, it does not strictly meet 
all of the parameters established by BUL at this time. It does play a strong current role as an advisory, 
especially on the application of legal issues to the members operations. As the Charter of the organiza-
tion acts as a guide and establishes the general guidelines for members to follow, one can assume that 
the specific details of the finalized CoC will follow that general path and that the BAPSC will meet the 
requirements of the aspects of BUL as an adjudicator. 
5. Group Interaction and Norm Compliance
84. Under the theory of BUL the members of the private institutionalized groups meet frequently, 
not only at events specifically related to the group, but also in other forums related to the industry. This 
repeated interaction serves to reinforce the fraternity within the group, and simultaneously creates direct 
implications on the behavior of the group members and their norm compliance. It specifically serves 
to accentuate reputation as an ordering force amongst the members, as repeated interaction elevates 
the desire to preserve a high standing amongst the group and in turn a lower likelihood to deviate from 
internal institutional norm compliance.152 Within a small closed group environment, mechanisms such 
as hallway gossip and public shaming are effective in dissuading members from violating established 
internal norms of the group.153 Reputation thus becomes a commodity of the utmost worth for the mem-
bers, where the risk of damage to that reputation serves to maintain the compliance of the members with 
the norms of the organization.154 Thus although the association assume the good faith of the companies 
in following the internal norms, the role of the reputation plays a factor that means that it is in the actors 
best interest to follow the norms as they have more to lose than gain from not. 
85. Due to length limitations an in-depth analysis of the patterns and frequency of the interaction 
of the members of the IPOA and BAPSC falls outside of the scope of this article. Suffice to say that 
in terms of the application of BUL to the two institutions that the formal and informal interaction of 
the members is high. Both organizations take active roles in organizing professional conferences and 
working sessions, ranging from breakfast meetings to large scale multi-day conferences.155 There is also 
substantial data that proves interaction on a more social level amongst members through events that are 
planned within the auspices of the events of the organizations as well as on the individual impetus mem-
149  Ibid.
150  Art. 2, Charter BAPSC, http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp
151  Key Documents, http://www.bapsc.org.uk
152  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 185
153  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 156; L. Bernstein. “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry”. Michigan 
Law Review, vol. 99, no.7, 2001. pp. 1745-1762
154  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 172
155  For more information see the dedicated events calendar microsites: IPOA- http://www.ipoaworld.org/
eng/calendar.html; BAPSC- http://www.bapsc.org.uk/events.asp
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bers. In relation to the application of BUL in this investigation, the general findings of more in depth 
research have proven that both the IPOA and the BAPSC foment not only the interaction of the members 
within the forum of the association, but that there also exists a high level of interfertilization amongst the 
members beyond the organized association events. Thus, the factors that BUL has outlined as motivators 
for norm compliance based on reputation effects of repeated interaction are met.156 
6. Conclusion
86. The analysis of the application of BUL to the IPOA and BAPSC proves that the two institutions 
meet the requirements established by the theory. They are organization that have legally institutionalized 
with a concrete mission and vision that seek to better the standards in the PMSC sector. Following the 
parameters of BUL, both associations have a corpus of members that demonstrate professional homoge-
neity and carry out specific admission processes to maintain this professional profile. 
87. The investigation has further demonstrated that IPOA and the BAPSC function on the basis of 
substantive internal rules, which are organic norms based in and emanating from the daily practices of 
the members. These norms reflect and simultaneously condition the behavior of the members. The ex-
tent to which this is possible is more evident in the CoC of the IPOA, where the BAPSC uses its Charter 
while the full CoC is finalized. 
88. The research has shown that in accordance with BUL these internal norm based systems also 
establish the procedural measures and remedies, with the possibility of modification, creating a private 
quasi-judicial system within the organization in part due to the dispute and sanctioning elements to 
monitor compliance. The system of the creation, interpretation, application of the norms of the internal 
regulatory system describes the creation of a private legal community. The systems that BUL describes 
as applicable to the associations in question are self-sufficient and self-executing, remaining separate 
from the state system. The application of the internal norms remains an intra-community issue, where 
order and compliance are reinforced due in part to the consequences in reputation for a member who 
violates the norms.157
VI. Aggregation to the State Level
1. Initial Considerations
89. The analysis has thus forth demonstrated that the IPOA and BAPSC meet the basic insti-
tutional parameters established by BUL. One can now turn to the subsequent phase of the theory and 
examine their potential as institutions that act as sources of regulatory content at a state and interstate 
level. In this context BUL proposes that in the course of being utilized by these organizations, the in-
ternal institutional norms frequently take the form of more formal binding regulation within a type of 
state level law.158 Thus the subsequent phase that BUL describes is a process where the norms filter from 
the informal to the formal; a conversion where the norms becoming effectively binding through a state 
sponsored instrument. This can occur when the norms harden into law at the state level, be it in domestic 
or international instruments. BUL describes two general ways in which this content aggregation occurs. 
Horizontal aggregation describes a link to international instruments and institutions, such as the World 
Bank, the United Nations or the WTO.159  The vertical aggregation describes linkages to regional and 
domestic systems.160
156  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 156.
157  J.	levit, Infra note 63, pp. 1199-1200.
158  J.	levit, Infra note 61, pp. 172-3.
159  J.	levit, Infra note 57, pp. 119-121.
160  Ibid pp. 122-124.
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90. BUL describes the efficiency of the internal norms as a big attribute for their transition to the 
state level. It could be described as a comparative advantage founded in the fact that the norms emanate 
from the sector. Due to this fact it can then be argued that the practitioners better understand their sector 
than the organs of the state, and can thus more effectively formulate and apply norms and sanctions fo-
cused in relevant issues.  The comparative advantage can also be found in the fact that the track record 
of norm compliance within the private community can be evaluated ex ante by the state in order to test 
and identify the most effective mechanisms. 
91. The aggregation then results in two main advantages. First, it creates a de facto sanction 
regime that increases the penalty for norm violating behavior.161 Thus the gravest violation can be met 
with more far reaching repercussions than expulsion from the association. Secondly the aggregation 
to the state level expands the applicability of the norms to cover more than only the initial association 
members.162
92. Thus the final section of the investigation will examine this last phase of BUL and the aggre-
gation of the internal norms of the IPOA and the BAPSC to the state level. The research looks to prove 
if the internal norms of the two associations examined complete the cycle of BUL. The affirmation of 
this will be demonstrated by the appropriation of the content of the internal norms into on the state level 
instruments. 
The investigation has focused on three processes of the formation of law in the attempt to 
prove if the process of BUL in relation to the internal norms of the association can be applied. In 
these instances it must be demonstrated that the norms of the associations have acted as either a 
base catalyst or a standard of reference in the policy formation process, or that the organization 
have taken the role of iterative or inspirational muse in the flow of the content to either nonbinding 
international agreements, international or domestic law in relation to the regulation of the PMSC 
sector. 
2. Montreux Document
93. In 2006 the Swiss government in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross began “the Swiss Initiative” in relation to international law applicable to the PMSC sector and the 
promotion of best practices in situations of armed conflict. After a series of intergovernmental meetings 
between January of 2006 and September 2008, the process terminated in consensus on the Montreux 
Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Opera-
tions of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (Montreux Document).163 The 
Montreux Document was distributed as a General Assembly document in the United Nations in Octo-
ber of 2008.164  Although the document is legally non-binding in relation to the existent international 
obligations and best practices of PMSC operations, to date, thirty-four states have notified the Swiss 
government of their support for the document.165
A) Aggregation of Topic
94. In analyzing the Montreux Document for the aggregation of concepts of the internal norms 
of the IPOA and the BAPSC, one must first take into consideration that although the internal norm sys-
161  Ibid pp. 125.
162  Ibid pp. 126.
163  The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, Federal Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, Government of Switzerland. http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc
164  “Letter dated 2 Oct 2008 from the Premanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addres-
sed to the Secretary-General”, A/63/467–S/2008/636, 6 Oct 2008.
165  See full list of participating states as 28 Oct 2009, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Government of 
Switzerland. http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html
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tems of the associations and the document treat the same PMSC sector, the subjects are distinct. The 
associations deal with the company, whereas the Montreux Document deals with states.166 Therefore, 
the difference in the subject obviously results in few verbatim appropriations from the CoC of the IPOA 
and the Charter of the BAPSC into the document. But the content aggregation on the part of the state 
officials is evident in an analysis of the Montreux Document by topic.
95. In the examination by concept of the aggregation of the internal norms of the IPOA and the 
BAPSC, there appear nine topics that demonstrate concordance. Although length limitations of this ar-
ticle affect the depth in which each of these topics can be examined, one can take as general examples 
the common treatment in a global sense between the Montreux Document, the CoC of the IPOA and the 
Charter of the BAPSC of issue such as humanitarian and human rights, combined with the respect of 
national laws.167 The documents also simultaneously attend to issues related to labor laws, the establis-
hment of rules in relation to the use of force and its use in defensive modes.168
96. The analysis also reveals various analogous topics between the CoC of the IPOA and the Do-
cument of Montreux, where both positively specify the parameters for the course of action necessary to 
remedy illicit acts, the need to vet and train employees, and the necessity to acquire licit arms though the 
correct channels.169 The Charter of the BAPSC alludes to the same points, but they remain to be positi-
vely iterated in the final CoC of the association.
B) The Association as Muse
97. Having seen these common topics, what is more important in the analysis of the aggregation 
in terms of BUL in the Montreux Document is the role the associations took in the formation of the 
document. As Levit’s investigations have proven
‘Bottom-up lawmaking is a normative march between communities, and moments of inter-
face are endemic to its path.  Yet, these moments are wrought with multifaceted complexity. 
As informal, practice-based norms permeate more formal, lawmaking communities, the it-
erative process produces positive synergies.  On the one hand, informal rules and institutions 
spark jurisgenerative creativity among official lawmaking institutions, enhancing the quality 
of deliberations on substantive issues as well as the effectiveness of ensuing legal rules.’170
In this sense, BUL is a process that represent more than dialogue, but rather a strong normative 
interplay between actors.171
98. This interplay between communities is evident in the analysis on the formation of the Mon-
treux Document.172 During the various meetings in the auspices of the initiative between 2006 and 2008 
the PMSC industry was regularly consulted.173 The IPOA and the BAPSC took part in these intergovern-
mental meetings.174 They were present in the first steps of the initiative in the first day of the preliminary 
166  Infra note 164, Point 8.
167  Montreux Document: 1.a.1-1.a.2, B9-10, C14-15, E.22, E.26(a), III.12; IPOA CoC Article 1.1; BAPSC 
Charter Para 3,4,8.
168  Montreux Document: 6.b,6.c.10, 13, 18; IPOA CoC: 6.5,6.11,6.3,6.4,9.2.1,9.2.2, BAPSC Charter: Para 1.
169   Montreux Document: 11.a,11.b,11.c; IPOA CoC:9.4.1,9.4.3.
170  J.	levit, Infra note 4, pp. 1182.
171  Ibid, pp. 1183.
172  It must be noted that the meeting in relation to the formation of the Montreux Document were held behind 
closed doors. The analysis in this section is based in publicly available documents relating to the process and data 
and commentaries facilitated in interviews with the author.
173  Governments acknowledge duty to control private military and security companies, ICRC Feature, 19 Sept 2008.
174  The participation of the association was corroborated in interview with representatives of the asso-
ciations, although it must be noted that at points some commentaries pointed to a desire for more involve-
ment in the process. The official reports on the meetings reflect the presence of the association, using the 
definition of industry representatives or other experts.
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workshops in 2006, where the intention was to give government representative the opportunity to dia-
logue and share experiences with industry representatives, where the representatives outlined the steps 
they were taking through the associations to promote best practices. 175  Amongst the topics presented 
were: the vetting procedures for employees, training in humanitarian and human rights, operating proce-
dures, internal discipline systems and the refusal of contracts that could include illegal activity.176 In this 
way the perspectives and opinions of the associations acted in a complementary and mutually reinfor-
cing manner. Furthermore the associations were also present in the second meeting on the formation of 
the Montreux Document that took place in November of 2006, although in this instance with a reduced 
number of representatives while intergovernmental exchanges continued.177 
99. Posterior to this meeting, between October and December 2007 four expert consultations took place 
between the Swiss Government, the ICRC, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Geneva Center for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The intention of these consultations was to bring together 
recommendations on improvements in the draft texts of the initiative. On the basis of these recommendations 
the final document was presented in the last intergovernmental meeting.178 The presence of the associations in 
these consultations is demonstrated via the positions that the President of the IPOA and the Policy Director of 
the BAPSC hold as members of the Advisory Group on Private Security of the DCAF.179 In addition, although 
the structure of the IPI differs from the DCAF, the organization has expressed its belief in the importance of 
the formation of professional associations by the private sector, where the goals should be the promotion of 
CoCs, the inculcating of trade standards and the sponsorship of policy guidelines.180 Thus, taking the direct and 
indirect roles of the associations in the consultation process attests to the capacity of the IPOA and BAPSC to 
act as iterative and inspirational muses in the formation process of the Montreux Document. 
3. Afghan Law Dalw 1386
100. According to BUL vertical aggregation occurs when the contents of the internal norms of the 
private associations are aggregated into domestic or regional legal systems. A clear example of this can 
be seen when one analyzes the application of BUL to the IPOA in the Afghan Dalw 1386 on the regula-
tion of PMSC with Afghan national territory.181 In this instance the Afghani legislators and the Ministry 
of the Interior opted to utilize the IPOA standards found in the CoC as the basis for the establishment of 
the procedures that both foreign and domestic PMSC must follow to legally operate in the country. Ac-
cording to the system created by the Afghan government without reservations, all PMSC must commit 
to observe the IPOA standards in order to receive an operating license.182
175  Workshop of Governmental Experts and Industry Representatives on Private Military/ Security Compa-
nies: 16-17 Jan 2006. Zurich, Switzerland. Federal Department of Foreign Affaire FDFA. Directorate of Interna-
tional Law DIL. Swiss Confederation. Summary of Chair. Pg. 1.
176  Ibid, pp. 3.
177  Expert Meeting of Government and Other Experts on Private Military and Security Companies:13-14 Nov 
2006, Montreux Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affaire FDFA, Directorate of International Law DIL, 
Swiss Confederation, pp 2.
178  Third meeting of Governmental and other experts on Private Military and securoty Companies. 14-16 
April 2008, Montreux, Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affaire FDFA, Directorate of International 
Law DIL, Swiss Confederation. pp1. Chair Summary.  It must be noted that several working groups that discussed 
pertinent topics took place, but a specific list of these groups and their participants was not available.
179  List of members of the Advisory Group http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/advisory-group
180 	F.	Manzini, In Good Company: The role of business in security sector reform, Demos & The International 
Peace Academy, 2005, pp. 27, 82. Also see J.	cockayne	et	al, Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global 
Security Industry, International Peace Institute, 2009, pp. 9. (expressing that the standards developed by the as-
sociations can bee seen as a starting point for the regulation of the industry).
181  Procedure for Regulating Activities of Private Security Companies in Afghanistan, Feb 2008 (Dalw 1386), 
Ministry of Interior, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/countries/results/
taxonomy%3A237.1
182  Art. 14 (8) & Art. 15 (6), Procedure for Regulating Activities of Private Security Companies in Afghani-
stan, Feb 2008 (Dalw 1386), Ministry of Interior, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
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101. In this way the Afghan government explicitly incorporated the complete content of the CoC 
into the domestic law of the country. The verbiage of the articles has undeniable impact, as the legisla-
tors did not transpose sections of text but rather made a reference to the external document to be applied 
in its amended version over time. Thus the Afghan government deposits total faith in the IPOA and it 
CoC, demonstrating a strong example of vertical aggregation and the institution as muse.
4. Evolution to possible vertical and horizontal aggregation
102. After having seen the two examples of vertical and horizontal aggregation, there is a third 
example that is worthy of investigating. In April of 2009 the British government announced a public 
consultation on the preferred option to promote high standards of conduct for PMSC industry.183 The 
policy proposal was comprised of three main parts including: working with the UK industry to promote 
high standards through a code of conduct, using the government’s status as a buyer to contract only 
those companies that demonstrate that they operate to high standards, and an international approach to 
promote higher global standards, based on key elements of the UK approach.184
103. What is interesting in the policy proposal in relation to BUL is the proposed role of the 
BAPSC within the policy option.185 According to the published documentation the association would 
work with the government to formulate a CoC and would be the organization in charge of its implemen-
tation.186 In this way, the proposal makes the allusion to a future vertical aggregation of internal norm 
content of the BAPSC.
104. The proposal continues in proposing a system of international cooperation to attend to the 
issue of PMSC regulation.187 Using the Montreux Document as a stepping off point, the British proposal 
abdicates for the extension of the initiative, based in the standard established by the government and the 
BAPSC. It continues in foreseeing the establishment of an international secretariat to monitor the glo-
bal standards and ensure compliance on the part of the PMSC.188 Thus, the policy proposal outlines the 
creation of an international organization and the horizontal aggregation of the norms of the association 
into the international system.
5. Conclusion
105. The analysis demonstrates the directional flow of BUL, through which the internal norms of 
the private associations become hardened at the level of state instruments through the appropriation of 
the normative concepts. It has been demonstrated that the organization that meet the private legal com-
munities requirements of BUL in the PMSC sector have acted as iterative and inspirational muses for the 
state level officials in the formation of law. Thus the investigation has proven that the internal norms of 
both the IPOA and the BAPSC complete the cycle of BUL. The process BUL describes in these instan-
183  Public consultation on Private Military Companies (24/04/09), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/
latest-news/?view=PressS&id=16784533
184  General Ministerial Statement, The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Mili-
band, 24 april 2009. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=16784533
185  See specific reference to the BAPSC, Evidence Base, Impact Assessment on Promoting High Standards 
of Conduct by PMSC Internationally, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office,Version 1, April 2009, pp. 14. §46. 
www.fco.gov.uk
186  Policy Proposal, Consultation Document, Consultation on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by Pri-
vate Military and Security Companies Internationally, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, pp. 9. http://www.
fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/publications/consultations1/
187  Consultation Document, Consultation on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by Private Military and 
Security Companies Internationally, pp. 5. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/publications/publications/
consultations1
188  Internationally Agreed Benchmark Standard for PMSC, Consultation Document, Consultation on Promot-
ing High Standards of Conduct by Private Military and Security Companies Internationally, pp. 10. §21
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ces demonstrates how the role of the state officials may be changed, but not eliminated. It represents the 
aggregation by the state of the regulatory schema in relation to the PMSC sector from the associations 
due to either their efficiency or the inspirational role played by the private associations.
VII. Conclusion
106. In summation, the increased reliance of the services provided by the PMSC sector, in this 
article assessed mainly in terms of the state-PMSC relationship, raises questions on how to best appro-
ach the regulation of the sector. The need for more efficient methods of regulation is made evident in 
large part due to the deficiencies seen in the application of both IHL and human rights law, as well as 
the intrinsic control and monitoring issues inherent in delegation. The complexity of the industry and 
the large variety of services it provides to distinct clients, in diverse situations, under variant contracts, 
underlines the areas where the legal norms lack indisputable application. But it appears that the classic 
state centered theories of policy formation are hindered because of a lack of political will or a lack of 
complete comprehension on how to best regulate the complex industry. Thus, in the attempt to explore 
alternative methods of the formation of policy content, the article has examined the application of BUL, 
as a compliment to classic model.
107. The analysis has shown that the IPOA and the BAPSC meet the institutional requirements 
established by the theory, specifically the creation of an internal self-sufficient and self-executing norm 
system from the practical experiences of a professionally homogeneous member group. The analysis 
has further demonstrated that these private quasi-judicial communities have acted as iterative and inspi-
rational muses for state level officials, where the internal norms act as a base catalyst and a standard of 
reference against which official legislators redact and evaluate the subsequent law, leading to the aggre-
gation of policy content into legislative instruments directed at the regulation of the PMSC sector. 
108. The investigation describes a process where  BUL and the classic theory function side by 
side, but where the role of the state in the development of those instruments has been changed though 
not eliminated. The analysis of the BUL process in relation to the PMSC sector points to change in 
monopoly of the state, where instead of the formation of policy to be internalized in practice, it shows 
indications of an organic process centered on the norms created by practitioners being externalized to 
the state level. Thus it can be said that the public-private sector interaction takes on an additional level 
than just the provision of services on behalf of the PMSC. In this context BUL present an opportunity 
for a new style of approach to the formation of regulatory policy.
